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Abstract: During the 1980s, refugee camps along the Thai–Cambodian border
constituted the power base for the civil war parties opposing the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK, 1979–91). Politics of accommodation and basic
services also played a key role in the ‘original accumulation’ of political power
by the new regime in Phnom Penh. The resettlement process of Cambodia’s
deserted cities developed into a major playground for clientelism, the founda-
tion of Cambodia’s state-building process after the Khmer Rouge. Focusing
on the archival heritage of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cam-
bodia (UNTAC) 1992–93, a spatial analysis of Phnom Penh’s political geography
from the late 1970s to the late 1990s will be provided. This paper argues that
the UNTAC time marked a watershed, whose impact has been underrated for
Cambodia’s political future: the transition in the accommodation policy of a
besieged regime. UNTAC did not end the civil war, but changed the political
economy of the country. As the need to ‘camp-in’ and share billeted living
space gradually diminished, the socialist ‘moral economy’ mutated into quick
money politics and political family business to ensure the hegemonic status of
Cambodia’s ruling party further.
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Twice within a few years, the city of Phnom Penh morphed into an urban refugee
camp. Due to war-related migration, Cambodia and its capital witnessed extreme
demographic changes in the late 1970s. As a ‘sideshow’,1 the Kingdom of Cam-
bodia2 had gradually become involved in the Vietnam War.3 Waves of migration
swept into the country’s cities from the combat zones and from the target areas of
1 William Shawcross (1979), Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia, Simon
and Schuster, New York.
2 After the coup against Prince and Head of State Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970, Cambodia
became a republic (Khmer Republic, monarchy abolished by the 1972 Constitution) headed by
President Lon Nol until April 1974; see: Justin J. Corfield (1994), Khmers Stand Up! – A History
of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Univer-
sity, Melbourne.
3 Second Indochina War (1955–1975). Saigon, the capital of the Republic of Vietnam (1955–75),
was taken by North Vietnamese troops and ‘Vietcong’ on 30 April 1975, two weeks after the fall
of Phnom Penh.
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US carpet bombings4 along the borders to Laos and South Vietnam. When the
advancing Khmer Rouge fighters finally closed their military encirclement of Phnom
Penh, over two million people – more than twice the peacetime population – were
trapped in the pocket. Immediately after the victorious entry on 17 April 1974, the
revolutionary leadership launched its most radical reform: the forced ‘ruraliza-
tion’ (or de-urbanization) of Phnom Penh’s resident population and the ‘repatriation’
of the war refugees to the countryside.
After severe border skirmishes and the complete political break with Hanoi,
Vietnamese troops launched an invasion against the Pol Pot regime, liberated Phnom
Penh in a swift military operation, and occupied most of Cambodia during the
monsoon dry season in the winter of 1978/79 within a matter of weeks. The Khmer
Rouge rounded up the population under its control and withdrew.5 Cambodia/
Kampuchea became a protectorate of Vietnam,6 while the Khmer Rouge reversed
its tactics and became a guerrilla force again: first in Cambodian territory and
later, edged out by the so-called K5 Plan and military offensive of Vietnamese
and PRK troops (1985–89)7 beyond the border within refugee camps in Thailand.
This bipolar geography of local power and international spheres of influence per-
sisted until the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 and the closure of the border
refugee camps.
What did happen to Phnom Penh after the Khmer Rouge retreated in 1979 is a
question this paper will address, analysing the evolution of the spatial order from
a camp-like urban situation to an open city. On the micro and macro levels, the
origins of Cambodia’s current socio-political realities can be identified.
Conservative leaders of the Vietnamese-sponsored Communist Party of the PRK
were initially reluctant to accept the immediate repopulation of the towns. The
official recognition of the re-urbanization was granted by the Council of Minis-
ters only in 1984.8 The process could not be stopped, and the capital’s population
increased exponentially from several thousands in 1979 to about half a million in
1988 (see Appendix). In that year, Uk Bunchheaun, a former Khmer Rouge defec-
tor and PRK Minister of Justice, commented in the minutes of the Council of
Ministers, ‘We are in a war of houses and a war of land’.9 This ‘war’, however,
4 Later on, the bombing campaigns targeted the whole north-eastern part of Cambodia – the total
tonnage of ordnance was the largest since the Second World War. One objective of the US Air
Force was to halt the advance of the Khmer Rouge; see Owen Taylor and Ben Kiernan (2006),
‘Bombs over Cambodia’, The Walrus, October, pp 62–69.
5 Around 300,000 were forcefully displaced during the retreat, according to Nayan Chanda (1986),
Brother Enemy: The War after the War, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, New York and
London, pp 370.
6 The way scholars, journalists, politicians or witnesses portray the Vietnamese intervention oscil-
lates between (brutal) occupation and (gratefully accepted) liberation: for example, see Stephen
R. Heder (1980), Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance, Asian Studies Monographs No 27,
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok; Marie-Alexandrine Martin (1994), Cambodia: A Shattered
Society, University of California Press, Los Angeles, CA, and London, p 215; Michael Vickery
(1984), Cambodia: 1975–1982, South End Press, Boston, MA, pp 189–252.
7 Margaret Slocomb (2001), ‘The K5 gamble: national defence and nation building under the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Kampuchea’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 32, No 2, pp 195–210;
Margaret Slocomb (2002), The People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989 – The Revolution
after Pol Pot, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, pp 229–251; Esmeralda Luciolli (1988), Le Mur de
Bambou – Le Cambodge après Pol Pot, Régine Deforges, Paris.
8 Evan Gottesman (2002), Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge – Inside the Politics of Nation Build-
ing, Yale UP, New Haven and London, p 200.
9 Ibid, p 320.
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reached fever pitch during the years of the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC). In Phnom Penh, against the background of the civil war,
the PRK government became sovereign in the state of emergency by the political
economy of accommodation.
The UNTAC period reconsidered: aims and approaches of the paper
Embedded in the geopolitics of the Cold War, socio-topographical conditions have
influenced Cambodia’s political geography and future decisively. Little research
has focused on this, particularly as a close-up on the re-urbanization of Cambo-
dia. Evan Gottesman probably gives the most detailed account of Phnom Penh
after the Khmer Rouge, but does not discuss the relationship between politics and
urban space from a geographical perspective. His primary interest and time frame
are the years before UNTAC. Other researchers highlight the transitional period
of UNTAC and its aftermath.10 In this respect, this paper offers a further study of
the issues that deal with the ‘bigger picture’ of Cambodia before and after Khmer
Rouge rule (1975–79). The focus is on the transitional period, when UNTAC (1992–
93) sought to control the capital. The theme is examined from four different angles:
first, ‘from below’, by looking at the neo-inhabitants of Phnom Penh; second, by
analysing spatially how Phnom Penh was resettled at a micro level; third, by see-
ing how the politics of accommodation worked in situ; and finally, the paper will
assess the impact of the late PRK regimes in easing measures on the economy and
of the transitional period on the real estate situation. In doing so, the paper ex-
plores the voluminous archival heritage of the UN Authority: the so-called UNTAC
files kept by the National Archives of Cambodia in Phnom Penh (NAC).
As a general framework to interpret these recently disclosed sources spatially, I
refer in particular to Adeline Carrier’s pioneering study, which examines the period
leading up to that of UNTAC.
In her thesis, Carrier scrutinizes the principles of the People’s Republic of
Kampuchea (1979–91), guiding the reappropriation of Phnom Penh’s real estate
as the new Khmer–Vietnamese government took over the capital at the end of
1978.11 Carrier systematically unfolds the modus of real estate allocation, its hier-
archy and the rule of order by PRK law and informal practice. She also discerns
growing contradictions between socialist policies set up in the initial years of the
People’s Republic, and the creeping transition of political and daily practice into
that of the ‘market economy’ towards the end of its rule. In 1993, the constitution
of the restored kingdom included an article for the adoption of a market economy
system.12 In part, this economic transition was already under way before the arrival
10 Slocomb, supra note 7; Caroline Hughes (2003), The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transi-
tion, 1991–2001, Routledge-Curzon, London and New York; David W. Roberts (2001), Political
Transition in Cambodia 1991–99 – Power, Elitism and Democracy, Curzon, Richmond; Simon
Springer (2010), Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order – Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contesta-
tion of Public Space, Routledge, London and New York.
11 Adeline Carrier (2007), ‘Les “lois de la possession” à Phnom Penh: conversion des droits d’usage
résidentiel issus du contexte socialiste de réappropriation urbaine (1979–1989) en droits de
propriété’, PhD dissertation, University of Paris VIII.
12 Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in Phnom Penh on 21 September 1993,
Chapter V, Article 56; cf Raoul M. Jennar (1994), Les constitutions du Cambodge: 1953–1993
(Textes rassemblés et présentes par R.M. Jennar), La Documentation Française, Paris.
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of UNTAC when more pragmatically oriented groups of the PRK leadership gained
the political upper hand over communist hardliners.13 The ‘top-down’, legalistic
and socio-urbanistic approach of Carrier will be extended here by a ‘bottom-up’
perspective, analysing ‘voices’ from the UNTAC files, completed by investiga-
tive interviews conducted during the research period in Cambodia in the winter of
2011–12.
The ‘original accumulation’ of political power in Phnom Penh after the
fall of the Khmer Rouge
‘Original accumulation’,14 in its initial Marxist sense, concerns the historical ori-
gins of real capital15 and how ‘class distinction’ (‘Klassenunterschiede’) came to
be.16 That is a vital question for the establishment of a new order in Cambodia
after Pol Pot’s reign of terror. In Cambodia, where land was abundant, only city
space was a scarce commodity. The real estate and housing sector of Phnom Penh
remained – just as in any economy above the level of subsistence living – a field
of political interventions of all sorts.17
While the open conflict of the civil war lasted,18 the whole country was divided
along suspicious and violent lines of first two, then four political camps in two
coalition blocs. This situation materialized in a fragmented regional topography.
The necessity for the government of the PRK to ‘engineer’ loyalty to counterbal-
ance its opponents along the border turned Phnom Penh virtually into a camp,
which hence became a place for the ‘original accumulation’ of political and eco-
nomic power.
13 After the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, the second PRK constitution of 1989, replacing
the one of 1981 (which was modelled on the Vietnamese) ended the socialist economy, especially
the collectivization policy and collective farming; see Viviane Frings (1993), The Failure of
Agricultural Collectivization in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989), Working Pa-
per 80, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne; Viviane Frings (1994),
‘Cambodia after decollectivization (1989–1992)’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 24, No 1,
pp 49–66. Additionally, for the real estate sector, see Valérie Clerc and Virginie Rachmuhl (2008),
Les marchés fonciers et immobiliers des quartiers informels à Phnom Penh, Éditions du Gret,
Paris, pp 37–69; East-West Management Institute (2003), Land Law of Cambodia – A Study and
Research Manual, prepared by the East-West Management Institute, Phnom Penh.
14 Karl Marx (1973), ‘Ursprüngliche Akkumulation’, Das Kapital (MEW 23), p 742, in English
slightly misleading; also called ‘primitive’ or ‘primeval’.
15 Property and/or the means of production in the broad sense.
16 Cf David Harvey (2005), The New Imperialism, Oxford UP, Oxford, pp 145–149; James K. Glassman
(2006), ‘Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation by “extra-eco-
nomic” means’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol 30, No 5, pp 608–625.
17 For an economic overview, see Margaret Slocomb (2010), An Economic History of Cambodia in
the Twentieth Century, NUS Press, Singapore.
18 Cambodian Civil War (1970–75) and the Cambodian–Vietnamese War 1977/78–1989, the main
front of the Third Indochina War, while the brief but intensively fought Sino-Vietnamese War of
1979, a punitive action of the People’s Republic of China for Vietnamese attack on its ally Pol
Pot, was restricted to the countries’ borderlands; see King C. Chen (1987), China’s War with
Vietnam 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA. In
academia there is no final consensus on when this Third Indochina War ended: 1989, 1991 (UNTAC
mission) or 1999, the year of the final collapse of the Khmer Rouge military when the last leading
member of Pol Pot’s inner circle, Ta Mok (nom de guerre of Chhit Choeun, also known as ‘Brother
Number Five’), was captured by the Cambodian army; for the late Khmer Rouge, see Kevin
Rowley (2006), ‘Second life, second death: the Khmer Rouge after 1978’, in Susan E. Cook, ed,
Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda – New Perspectives, Transaction Publishers, New Bruns-
wick and London, pp 191–213.
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This process gained strength when Vietnamese and FUNSK19 troops entered
the city. Confronted only with sporadic firefights and no prolonged resistance,
Phnom Penh was declared liberated on 7 January 1979. At strategic points along
the inner city perimeters,20 checkpoints were installed, guarding the most impor-
tant entrances to the city. The city was divided into two parts, making the central
north–south boulevard21 its border: to the east of this administrative demarca-
tion, the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party
(KPRP) was in charge; to the west, the People’s Committee of Phnom Penh (see
Figure 1) was in charge.22 It is not clear for how long this division was effective
or whether this separation had any practical use at all. However, it is also a fact
that the supreme administrative authorities of the People’s Republic established
their headquarters in the former government district close to the riverside.23 Some
reasons for that are obvious: the buildings were originally constructed for that
purpose and the site was also the former prestigious ‘heart’ of the city, including
the adjacent National Museum, Palace and ‘Silver Pagoda’ (Wat Preah Keo).
Further motives for the choice, though, may be linked to the ruling state of ex-
ception and martial law. First, the district gave ample room for building up ‘gated
communities’, which could also support each other in case of a siege or possible
counteroffensive of the Khmer Rouge. Second, short distances facilitated com-
munications and minimized the risk of exposure of the leaders during their
meetings. And third, the ‘rest’ of the slowly re-settling city formed a security
buffer against the outside, while the inner kernel of political power became a
high-security zone – still effective today.
Outside the capital, party membership remained low due to these ‘restrictive
core group qualifications’.24 The review process of political loyalty and individual
trustworthiness, organized by the Central Organization Committee under Viet-
namese supervision, required Cambodians to prove a ‘clear personal history’ (bravat
roup). The sluggishness of this process forced PRK ministers to circumvent this
mode of recruiting and to search for cadres and staff on their own.
All in all, Phnom Penh in the early days of the PRK bore a stunning resemblance
to the topography of early modern military camps, which were vast, movable and
self-sustaining ‘cities’ coming to a standstill. There were also many commonalities
19 Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (Front d’Union nationale pour le salut du
Kampuchéa), the political nucleus of the new Cambodian regime.
20 Today, this half-ring road is named after the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF).
21 Boulevard Achar Mean (former Bd Monivong, re-baptized with this name after the UNTAC pe-
riod).
22 Dividing Phnom Penh into different spheres stemmed from a long practice: the independent kings
of Cambodia before the colonial age erected entire new palace quarters to distance themselves
from the rest of the capital’s residents; the French colonial period featured a predominantly ‘white-
upper’ and administrative city in the north of Phnom Penh; Norodom Sihanouk promoted the
development of Phnom Penh’s South with his new modern-style Chamkar Mon Palace as the
central point of a whole new district to be built. Also, the Khmer Rouge implemented similar
spatial arrangements: all Phnom Penh-based members of the Communist Party’s Standing Com-
mittee were living or working either in the vicinity of the palace or in other former government
locations in the centre of Phnom Penh.
23 Except for the military HQ (today’s Ministry of Defence) close to the encampment/barracks/
housing of the Phnom Penh ‘garrison’ in the east, and the Ministry of Information which was
established next to the transmitting station (on the site of the former Phnom Penh cathedral, one
of the few buildings deliberately destroyed by the Khmer Rouge).
24 Gottesman, supra note 8, at p 49.
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shared with contemporary camps of warlords.25 In these spatial arrangements, the
most important part – the quarters of the commander (and ‘war entrepreneur’),
his senior officers, families and friends in the middle, watched over by hand-
picked personal bodyguards – was concentrically enclosed by other troopers (and
their families) according to rank and branch of the force.26
As in the high times of mercenary armies in Europe, the leadership of the young
People’s Republic did not trust the people with which it surrounded itself. How-
ever, the elites had to accept their proximity for the sake of a common objective –
security and the building of stable neighbourhoods to reboot normal life. For the
elites of the new regime, the immediate neighbourhood became the site for the
‘original accumulation’ of political power by reciprocity. This was achieved in
two ways. First, only a reliable entourage of the Khmer government in Vietnam-
ese exile was entitled to have the first pick of its housing within the ‘government
district’ (the gated high-security area, which still persists today, see Figures 2 and
3). This constituted the ‘inner circle’. At the same time, outside the government
quarters, trustworthy members of committees allocated living space to the first
repatriates and refugees in the other districts of Phnom Penh. The ‘rest of the city’
was, thus, systematically assigned to ordinary ‘comrades’.
The formation of the PRK government district as a ‘civic centre’ (‘cité’)
The affair of ‘comrade Kann Man’ is instructive for the first case – the workings
of the ‘inner circle’ or ‘core group’ of power. In his capacity as designated foreign
minister of the shadow government, Hun Sen issued a limited carte blanche to
Kann Man, a member of his hand-picked staff, granting him the right to take into
possession any house of his choice (within the foreseen compounds of the foreign
ministry). The form left blank some space to write in the address, but Kann Man
did not fill it in. Nevertheless, he rightfully occupied House No 387, Rue Karl
Marx (Quai Sisowath during the PRK). The form (a hectograph), dated 24 De-
cember 1979, already featured the national emblem and a stamped seal of the
PRK, although the latter was not officially declared a state until 12 January 1980.
One year after the invasion of Pol Pot’s ‘Democratic Kampuchea’ began, Hun Sen
signed a real estate voucher, but only for a limited amount of time. This ‘tempo-
rary certification’, as it was translated, was to be submitted for approval to the
Revolutionary People’s Council and to the Municipal Committee of Phnom Penh
City. The governor of the city (‘Brother Khang Sarin’),27 had countersigned the
certificate on the same day, 24 December, at 6.35 pm local time. The minister,
however, reserved the exclusive right to make the final decision, which also sealed
a personal bond. Later, this 1979 document found its way into a complaint file
that the beneficiary submitted to UNTAC. Kann Man was looking for help after
25 For Early Modern Europe, see Geoffrey Parker (1996), The Military Revolution: Military Inno-
vation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Cambridge UP, Cambridge; and for modern ‘war
lords’, Mary Kaldor (1999), New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford
UP, Stanford, CA; or Sarah K. Lischer (2005), Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil
War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
26 To understand the different types of power practices of the anti-PRK groups, see Daniel Bultmann
(2015), Inside Cambodian Insurgency: A Sociological Perspective on Civil Wars and Conflict,
Ashgate, Farnham.
27 One of the Khmer exiles with the rank of Major in the Vietnamese Army and first Governor of
Phnom Penh (1979–80); for him and further exiles, see Chanda, supra note 5, Chapter 7.
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he had fallen out of Hun Sen’s favour and into disgrace. He was arrested during
UNTAC, and his career ended in one of the infamous PRK-SOC prisons.28
The case illustrates that each minister became the pivotal point for an inner
circle of political authority. The various ministerial compounds turned into trad-
ing grounds for loyalty, which made them into gravity fields for networks of
secondary and tertiary ‘circles’. At an organizational level, these prime political
urban neighbourhoods were to be self-sufficient: that is, the management of so-
cial life and the meeting of their material needs were modelled on rural krom
samaki (‘solidarity groups’ or ‘cooperatives’), which formed a unit of living and
working for industrial production in state-owned companies, or the cultivation of
collectivized land.29 This socialist way of living was never popular amongst Cam-
bodians, and never took root. The urban compounds, which Adeline Carrier fittingly
names ‘cités’,30 were privileged insofar as they offered the most security and ac-
cess to goods (even though the PRK government tried to avoid unequal treatment
in terms of provision) and – most importantly – proximity to power and decision
makers. Hun Sen (and others) became a patron not only thanks to the pressure of
Vietnamese bayonets, but also because he could provide for the daily needs of his
protégés. Housing was the key resource in that respect, and accommodation in
these ‘cités’ implied a privilege to be earned. To enhance his own symbolic capi-
tal, Hun Sen picked the location of his private residence after careful consideration:
it faced the Independence Monument31 commemorating liberation from France.32
It should be noted that any patron of a district had to respect a delicate political
balance of loyalties: ‘corruption’ was systemic and worked in this rudimentary
state apparatus both top-down and bottom-up. It constituted a reciprocal process.
Such pyramidal networks of clienteles encompassed a mixture of ‘direct’ and ‘in-
direct’ rule. For the upper and top echelons, ‘direct rule’ meant entourage: to force
others into ‘the shadow of his name’, as Marcel Mauss puts it.33 For example, Hun
Sen and Chea Sim, partners as well as opponents in the internal power struggle
for the new rule of these years, could exercise face-to-face control only of their
inner circles. In doing so, they had to turn a blind eye to arrangements made by
members of lower ranks, in which their (deepest) shadows started to fade.
‘The regime had thus created a state apparatus, bestowing upon its cadres power
28 NAC/UNTAC.Box 18/1. Phnom Penh.CYA/AN/AC/ER/PP/105 – KANN MAN (all translation
into English provided and attached by UNTAC translators).
29 Slocomb, supra note 17, at pp 175–229.
30 ‘Cité’, in French, bears the extended meaning of ‘cité administrative, ouvrière’, etc, to designate
a civic centre, production site, etc. Additionally, it refers here to the situation of a gated commu-
nity (‘city in the city’).
31 It was erected in 1958 and stands at the intersection of Norodom and Sihanouk Boulevards;
another highly symbolic location is situated further east: the Cambodian–Vietnam Friendship
Monument erected in 1979 to commemorate the eternal socialist brotherhood of the two peoples
and as a reminder of the Vietnamese soldiers killed in action for the liberation of Cambodia (see
Figures 2 and 3).
32 In his authorized biography, he explained: ‘At that time, there was no residence for a foreign
minister, but here were so many empty houses in Phnom Penh – everybody could choose one,’ he
said. ‘I could get 300 houses if I wanted.’ Harish C. Mehta and Julie B. Mehta (1999), Hun Sen –
Strongman of Cambodia, Graham Brash, Singapore, p 90.
33 Marcel Mauss (1954, 2006), The Gift – Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies
(with an introduction by E.E. Evans-Pritchard), Cohen & West, London, pp 38–39. (The three
obligations: giving, taking, repaying); Techniques, Technology and Civilization (edited by Nathan
Schlanger), New York.
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and access to goods without making them accountable. The system was “anar-
chic” (anathibatey), according to government reports.’34
This necessary laissez-faire policy of flexible limits also left an imprint on the
urban morphology of Phnom Penh, which is still visible today. Let us use the
foreign ministry compound again as an example, but this time looking at it ‘bot-
tom-up’ from the political foot soldier’s viewpoint.
Originally, the personal bodyguards of Hun Sen and Chea Sim, being members
of their ‘households’,35 were assigned to a block south of the state guest house
(‘Hôtel d’état’), which hosted gradually more and more family members, soon
also friends, later even friends-of-friends (see Figures 2 and 3).36 Eventually, the
property was rented out or ‘sold’, not respecting the ban on dividing this plot of
land into lots (which explains the microstructure of the houses compared to the
neighbouring buildings). In fact, the original ‘owners’ were only usufructuary of
(e)state assets and, by law, not entitled to deal with their value in kind. The need
to let the followership take its share prevented the prosecution of any abuse as
long as the political standing of the patrons was not yet cemented – except in the
case of treason, when the above-mentioned comrade Kann Man was accused of
the worst-case scenario of malfeasance.37
Assigning self-sufficiency to these ‘sub-units’ left them with ample leeway, and
was also in harmony with the traditional custom that ‘land belonged to the tiller’:
that is, the peaceful occupation of land in accordance with the neighbours and, as a
second precondition, its continued use (continuous possession). Any violation of
these usages would have been regarded as despotism and disregard for order, which
the new leaders had promised to restore after the nightmarish revolutionary rule of
the Khmer Rouge. From the beginning, the political top ranks could not act as
absolute, but only as restrained ‘kings’. In their ‘cités’, they were virtually ‘encir-
cled’, and their power was held in check by their clients’ interests and expectations.
The creation of a sustainable power structure depended on preferential treatments
and cooperation of the individual patron’s followers, who expected to receive their
appropriate shares. These arrangements and hierarchies, however, also had to be in
accordance with the other cliques and factions that shared the same (physical) camp.
The ‘rest of the city’: the resettlement of the surrounding quarters
Left unattended for years in a tropical monsoon climate, the buildings of Phnom
Penh suffered considerably more from environmental impacts than from Khmer
Rouge vandalism. About a quarter of the buildings, especially the wooden houses,
were structurally unsound or damaged. An inventory and assessment listed 56,560
destroyed or uninhabitable units in total. However, the same investigation, conducted
34 Gottesman, supra note 8, at pp 96, 320.
35 Also called Chea Sim’s konchau (literally ‘children and grandchildren’ in Khmer).
36 This section is based on five investigative interviews (snowball sampling) with interpreters, January
2012.
37 In 2011, Chea Sim (1932–2015), former President of the Senate and of the Cambodian People’s
Party, seized his long-term bodyguard, Chief Lieutenant General Chhoeun Chantan, who started
his career in this neighbourhood (when Chea Sim was President of the National Assembly and the
grey eminence of the CPP), after Prime Minister Hun Sen named him as one of several military
officials involved in corrupt activities; see The Phnom Penh Post, 15 August 2011 – meanwhile,
he was sentenced to 26 years in prison.
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by the People’s Committee of Phnom Penh,38 also noted the fact that a sufficient
amount of houses remained basically intact. The redistribution of this housing
resource followed a specific topographical and social pattern.39 Phnom Penh’s
best-preserved urban structure was to be found around the market halls. The edi-
fices in these urban areas of high building density were executed in the style of
concrete ‘shop houses’ with at least two to three floors above the sales, service or
workshop area of the entrance foyer. For commercial purposes, such quarters were
also the most sought-after, and the ones close to the city centre were the first
blocks to be assigned. To prevent a disorderly and chaotic repopulation of the
capital, the Party Central Committee established an inter-ministerial body: the
‘Committee for the Establishment of Social Order and Security for the Capital of
Phnom Penh’. The social principle behind the assignment policy was twofold: the
demands were treated (a) in chronological order – first in, first served – according
to a (b) ranking of social needs, with priority given to widows with children,
families, single women, older followed by younger couples, and finally, bach-
elors. My interview partners unanimously agreed that the local PRK People’s
Committees respected this principle in order to build up trust and reciprocity.
However, they also remarked that flexible interpretations and creative manipula-
tions of the standards soon occurred on both sides.40 Usually, refugees or returnees
who applied for access to the city were initially ‘filtered’ at the military check-
points along the urban periphery. There, spontaneous alliances (or bribes) on the
spot could be helpful, as when, for example, a Khmer family was rewarded for its
care of a war orphan waiting in the queue at a checkpoint. The latter could speak
Vietnamese and persuaded the guards to let her new family in.41 Like all the others
before and after, these prospective new inhabitants were also brought to a demar-
cated transit zone (usually empty market halls or other premises), where their
social and political status and needs were assessed before the allocation of hous-
ing was decided. Allocation was granted either after an official hearing or informally
by the officials in charge. Bribes and small favours could accelerate the process
and could also influence the choice of real estate, which was basically not fore-
seen in the proceeding.
A review of Phnom Penh’s resettlement outside the ‘cités’ during the first cou-
ple of years topographically reveals decentred concentric circles of occupational
38 Ben Hong Kry (1987), La résurrection de la ville de Phnom Penh après la libération du 7 janvier
1979, Comité Populaire de Phnom Penh (mai 1987), Phnom Penh ; see also footnotes 42 and 43.
39 This section is also based on 100 semi-structured interviews with interpreters, January 2012,
randomly investigating shop owners and their location decision for this particular site. The frame-
work of themes to be explored included the questions of property and original assignment by the
authorities or later purchase of urban space; see Thomas Kolnberger (2012), ‘Phnom Penh nach
der urbanen Katastrophe – “Alltägliches Geographie-Machen” am Beispiel der Standortent-
scheidungen von Wirtschaft und Handel in einer südostasiatischen Metropole’, Mitteilungen der
Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft, Vol 154, pp 235–260.
40 ‘The Party’s effort to stop state officials from hiring friends and family had failed, offering thou-
sands of Cambodians the opportunity to live in the City. […] In the summer of 1980, the regime
attempted to reverse the flood by ordering municipal officials to send people back to the country-
side and by compiling a list of families authorized to stay. It was too late; by the end of the year,
Phnom Penh was home to more than three hundred thousand people.’ Gottesman, supra note 8, at
p 76.
41 Interview with owner of house No 15, Street 135/Corner Street 446, Chamkar Mon, close to the
so-called Russian Market, conducted 22 December 2011 (the only family in the entire neighbour-
hood to have stayed in the same place since 1980).
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density around the former market areas (settlement concentration in pockets). In
general, the population density was highest in the old city centre (for example, the
Central Market area) and declined progressively towards the periphery due to secu-
rity reasons and the quality of building structures. This relatively extensive primary
occupation underwent a process of intensification. Until the mid-1980s, the city had
virtually ‘filled up’ laterally and vertically, as more and more people shared the space
with latecomers (see Appendix). It became an advantage for someone from the
outside to know someone already established in the city, a person who could provide
accommodation and grant a kind of advanced clearance certificate to the People’s
Committee and the party warden of the block or subdistrict. The pyramidal laissez-
faire principle of the ‘cités’ was repeating itself on the micro level, as access to city
housing was valuable (and could be sold or ‘reserved’ for relatives or family). Simi-
larly, ‘chains of sales’ can be observed – that is, the proliferation of illegal and
informal selling of what was technically state property and the original accumula-
tion of petty capital in the lower ranks of the party.
The main difference, besides the difference in value, between the outer urban
areas and the ‘civic centre’ of the political elite and their entourage was that the
former had no particular security-zoning or social features like the gated commu-
nities of the ‘cités’. There were no immediate ‘shadows’ of the paramount political
leader. People who had successfully passed the gatekeepers were only expected
to be calm, orderly and loyal to the regime.
To recapitulate: the process of repopulating Phnom Penh by allocating ‘first choice’
of housing was intentionally biased from the beginning. The urban space served as a
means for social differentiation, since ‘first served’ order was not strictly observed,
nor a chronological ‘first come’– but rather operated in a political economy of space,
separating the common people from the political elites in senior, junior and subordi-
nated ranks of party leaders and apparatchiks. Asset value was assigned according to
the status of applicants, as a result of which habitable real estate – about one-quarter
of the available housing before the Khmer Rouge42 – was categorized as follows:
9,017 ‘villas’ (representative detached or semi-detached houses spaced apart from
the streets, usually with a garden); 4,972 ‘maisons’ (regular single houses, usually
one- or multiple-family dwellings); and 31,752 ‘compartiments’ (apartments). ‘Vil-
las’ and ‘maisons’ were again subdivided according to size and furnishing into nine
categories (‘classes’). The hierarchy of entitlement to official lodgings was then
specified by a decree of the PRK in 1982, which itself was modelled on the Vietnam-
ese practice of five categories of civil servants/functionaries (classes A–E), ranging
from ministers down to simple party officials and operatives.43
42 On the refugee situation and its impact on Phnom Penh’s urbanism before 17 April 1975, see Someth
Uk (1975), ‘Phnom Penh et son évolution urbaine’, Planification-Habitat-Information (Planning-
Housing-Information), (Secrétariat des missions d’urbanisme et d’habitat, Paris), Vol 79, Février, p
42 (map 10); J.C. Allaire (1971), Utilisation des terrains urbains en République Khmère, Projet
“Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat”, annexe numéro 4 au rapport périodique numéro 1, Paris.
43 Carrier, supra note 11, at pp 205–207, 288 ; and Laurent Pandolfi (2001), ‘Une terre dans prix,
réforme foncière et urbanisation au Viêt-Nam, Hanoi, 1986–2000’, PhD dissertation, University
of Paris VIII, p 64. Why only about a quarter of the available housing was categorized is not fully
comprehensible (see footnote 38). In parts, however, the difference may be explained by the
exclusion of spontaneous, habitable refugee settlements of Phnom Penh erected during the Khmer
Republic. Second, the counting of apartments gives no clear indication whether the count consid-
ers single accommodation units (single flats or apartments as part of a bigger housing unit) or
apartment blocks (or shop houses, which can have multiple floors). Nevertheless, these figures
represent the official stock for the redistribution of housing space.
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Figure 1. The first political division of the city and the location of the ‘cités’ in Phnom Penh,
1980.
Source: Own draft based on Adeline Carrier (2007), ‘Les “lois de la possession” à Phnom Penh:
conversion des droits d’usage résidentiel issus du contexte socialiste de réappropriation urbaine
(1979–1989) en droits de propriété’, PhD dissertation, Paris VIII; and US Army Map Service,
Phnom Penh 1963 (detail).
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Figure 2. Close-up of different ‘cités’ in Phnom Penh, 1980, with details of the situation in the
compounds of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the residence of Hun Sen and the block of the
(former) bodyguard settlements.
Source: Own draft based on Adeline Carrier (2007), ‘Les “lois de la possession” à Phnom Penh:
conversion des droits d’usage résidentiel issus du contexte socialiste de réappropriation urbaine
(1979–1989) en droits de propriété, PhD dissertation, Paris VIII, p 223.
Cité – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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From a juridical point of view, Phnom Penh’s real estate was declared owner-
less by the new regime. This tabula rasa was to avoid future conflicts with returnees
claiming their former property. A convenient side effect was that the year zero of
Cambodia’s ownership status also legalized the official confiscation of property
in favour of the emerging PRK apparatus; its elite could pick prime estates. Finally,
the expropriated fixed assets became the social capital of an emerging socialist
society. This urban situation formed a notable contrast to the countryside. In rural
areas where land was plentiful, local authorities did not intervene in the efforts of
returnees to reclaim their former properties. Cases of conflicting interests could
be settled amicably by occupying another place.44
The logic of scarcity of accommodation, which led to the establishment of a new
hierarchy, thus represented one side of the new regime’s steering process, while the
need for a jointly responsible ‘moral’ during the shortage economy of the initial
years constituted the other side of the coin. This ‘moral economy’45 operated in
small, closely knit neighbourhoods. It was challenged by the ‘peace in sight’ politics
of the late 1980s, dissolving the physical camp-like situation and, concurrently, by
free market principles, virtually ‘c(r)ashed-in’ during UNTAC in the early 1990s.
UNTAC: the transition of Cambodia’s bipolar demography
After losing control over most Cambodian territory to the Vietnamese (and the
Cambodian Government of PRK in Phnom Penh), the Khmer Rouge survived
politically along the Thai–Cambodian border, embedded in an ‘archipelago of
refugee camps’46 which formed their military and economic power base. At the
height of its mission, the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) sup-
ported about 300,000 people.47 In a civil war economy,48 surreptitiously linking
local shadow economies with the global market, people also became a resource in
terms of (military) manpower and material support. Two non-communist guer-
rilla factions49 joined this rump state in 1982, forming the so-called Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This government in exile, a
pure construct according to international law, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as
44 May Ebihara (1990), ’Revolution and reformation in Kampuchean village culture’, in David A.
Ablin and Marlow Hood, eds, The Cambodian Agony, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London, pp
33–34.
45 James C. Scott (1976), The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South-
east Asia, M.E. Sharpe, Princeton, NJ.
46 Christel Thibault (2008), L’archipel des camps – L’exemple cambodgien, Paris; Christel Thibault
(2005), ‘Conflits, refuges et enjeux frontaliers – Les déplacements forcés de la population du
Cambodge 1970–2000’, PhD dissertation, Université de Paris IV.
47 Between 1979 and 1990, the support amounted to US$940 million: the Thai–Cambodian relief
operation was labelled as the ‘Rolls-Royce’ of international aid by an NGO member cited in
Charlotte Benson (1993), ‘The changing role of NGOs in the provision of relief and rehabilita-
tion assistance: case study 2 – Cambodia/Thailand’, draft ODI working paper, Overseas
Development Institute, Regent’s College, London, pp 5–6, 20.
48 Christian Lechervy (1996), ‘L’économie des guerres cambodgiens: accumulation et dispersion’,
in François Jean and Jean-Christoph Rufin, eds, Economie des guerres civiles, Hachette, Paris,
pp 189–232.
49 The royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique,
et Coopératif) under Norodom Siahnouk and the ‘liberal-republican’ KPNLF (Khmer People’s
National Liberation Front) under Son Sann, together with the expelled Khmer Rouge (officially
now Party of Democratic Kampuchea, PDK) – formed the exile government, CGDK, later re-
named the National Government of Cambodia (NGC).
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its nominal figurehead, was supported by ‘the West’50 and China. During the last
stage of the Cold War, the CGDK represented the countervailing power of the
Phnom Penh regime and the Soviet Union as its global patron.51
As probably the last significant act of the bloc confrontation,52 the East and
West agreed to unite the ‘two Cambodias’ by name in the follow-up to the UN-
sponsored Paris Agreement conferences of 1989–91.53 The provisional ‘State of
Cambodia’ (SOC) should serve not only as a ‘neutralized’ zone by name, but as an
internationally monitored environment for the transition from civil war to a post-
conflict society. A peace mission was brought into being: the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Its mission consisted of preparing
the ground for fair and democratic first national elections, which included the
surveillance of the integration process of displaced persons from the border camps
and of the full withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.54
UNTAC was to administer and control the SOC in cooperation with the Supreme
National Council of Cambodia (SNC), which constituted the unique legitimate body
and source of authority throughout the transition. The SNC served as a quadripartite
interim authority representing the four civil war parties under the chairmanship of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk.55 On paper, and after an advance mission (UNAMIC),56
UNTAC took full interim responsibility for overseeing foreign affairs, defence,
finance, public security and information on 1 July 1992, making the SOC technically
an international protectorate of domestic and external affairs for a limited time. That
date was a diplomatic fiction, as the full deployment of UN administration staff was
delayed and was not considered complete until 27 September.57
UNTAC consisted of seven distinct components: human rights, civil administra-
tion, electoral, military, police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The civil administrative
sector was to assure a ‘neutral political environment conducive to free and fair
elections’, according to article 6 of the Paris Peace Agreement. Soon, however, the
PRK/SOC administration realized the weak performance of the UN supervision due
to a hesitant, partly contradictory practice within and between almost all components.58
50 The USA, US allies in Europe and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN,
founded 1967).
51 It even retained the UN seat of Cambodia until the end of the Cold War, when the seat was left
vacant from October 1990 until the Paris Agreement one year later.
52 The USSR was formally dissolved on 26 December 1991; cf Bernd Stöver (2011), Der Kalte
Krieg – Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters, 1947–1991, C.H. Beck, München.
53 At the first peace conference in Paris (Paris International Conference on Kampuchea, PICK), 30
July to 30 August 1989, all four delegation members of the civil war parties sat side by side
behind the long label plate ‘Cambodge’; a comprehensive settlement was signed two years later
on 23 October 1991 at the second Paris conference (Paris Conference on Cambodia, PCC).
54 Various estimations of the number of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia until the 1980s range from
100,000 to as many as 200,000; see the summary by Michael Vickery (2007), Cambodia: A Po-
litical Survey, Funan Press, Phnom Penh, pp 20–32.
55 A balance of six seats for the SOC and six for the opposing civil war parties (two each for
FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and DC/Khmer Rouge).
56 United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (October 1991–March 1992).
57 400–500 staff were earmarked for the civil administration; see Jarat Chopra (1994), United Na-
tions Authority in Cambodia, Occasional Paper No 15, Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International
Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, p 32.
58 The efficiency and performance of the UN mission in Cambodia is still highly disputed. For a
critical, but fair and comprehensive analysis with special regard to the military component, see
Peter Hazdra (1997), Die UNO-Friedensoperation in Kambodscha – Vorgeschichte, Konzept,
Verlauf und kritische Evaluierung des internationalen Engagements, Europäische Hochschul-
schriften, Reihe XXXI, Vol 322, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main.
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Moreover, the reputation, good standing and initial prestige of UNTAC among
the population deteriorated quickly for diverse reasons.59 Nevertheless, a ‘Com-
plaints and Investigation Service’ within the civil administration began to deal
with growing numbers of petitions of Cambodians against the SOC administra-
tion.60 As it turned out, the SOC authority and its political arm, the Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP),61 had obviously never lost their grip on Cambodia’s gov-
ernance. From the beginning the SOC, dominated by the CPP, played for time and
tried to safeguard political power. The party members’ control of real property
and economic resources helped to buttress this claim to leadership.
Indeed, UNTAC officials were taken by surprise: they had expected more cases
of ‘classical’ political harassment.62 Instead, an unanticipated high caseload of
disputes about ownership and property led to the formation of a specific ‘Com-
plaints Clarification Committee (CCC)’, which operated across the country. Politics
and property were inextricably connected in such a way that these ‘apolitical’
disputes – in its view – had the potential to threaten social peace and the ultimate
goal and raison d’être of UNTAC: fair elections. Even in the face of months-long
intimidation by increasingly aggressive Khmer Rouge attacks on UN personnel,
which peaked in March 1993, the elections were never in (geo)political danger:
no ‘interested third party’ for supporting a proxy war interfered any longer.63 What
the UNTAC authority witnessed and documented, however, was a struggle for the
distribution of privileges and scarce resources in the final phase: the definite pri-
vatization and capitalization of usufruct and common good for the time after the
UN mission had left.64
The files of UNTAC’s CCC and their context
It appears that the CCC, as a special branch, officially started its work on 17 Sep-
tember 1992, after more than 163 complaints had already been collected by UNTAC.
First we investigate the questions of numbers and timing and offer a preliminary
59 UNTAC/APRONUC, Interoffice Memorandum (Executive Summary) by Judy Ledgerwood to
Timothy Carney/Information-Education Program of 18 September 1992, Phnom Penh.
60 Michael W. Doyle (1995), UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate, Occasional
Paper Series, International Peace Academy, Boulder, CO.
61 Party formerly known as KPRP (Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party), renamed in 1991
after officially dropping its commitment to socialist ideology.
62 For instance, the search of premises of one of the 20 parties running for the election clearly
constituted a violation of the UN agreement. But, to keep handguns, semi-automatic weapons,
even a grenade launcher in a secret weapons stash, was illegal too: in Phnom Penh at this time, a
simple distinction between right and wrong did not exist; see NAC/UNTAC.Box 1/1.Daun Penh:
4.025 – SOK SARATH, Rassemblement pour la Solidarité Nationale.
63 In the meaning of ‘Interessierter Dritter’, according to the concept of Carl Schmitt (1995), Theorie
des Partisanen - Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen (4th German edition of 1963 –
Theory of the Partisan), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 79 ff; and Rolf Schoers (1961), Der
Partisan – Ein Beitrag zur politischen Anthropologie, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln, pp 247 ff.
Beijing withdrew any support for the Khmer Rouge in 1993; Sorpong Peou (2000), Intervention
& Change in Cambodia – Towards Democracy? Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
pp 381 ff, 405.
64 ‘The one area in which “privatization” has made considerable headway is commercial and resi-
dential property. In Phnom Penh alone, since 1989 some 100,000 units have been made private.
Too often, the neo “owners” have been well-placed party officials who, in effect, have transferred
state assets to themselves, often leasing them to foreigners at a handsome profit.’ Contemporary
analysis by George Irvin (1993), Rebuilding Cambodia’s Economy: UNTAC and Beyond, April,
Working Paper Series No 149, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, p 14.
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interpretation: a quantitative summary for Cambodia shows that the CCC regis-
tered a total of 1,252 complaints, 300 of which were in Phnom Penh alone. This
means that, on average, one new complaint was filed every second day for the
entire period of the UN mandate. The caseload represents the small evident part
of the phenomenon. First of all, only 12 out of 21 provinces were investigated
and, in general, only one specific category of Cambodians seemed to file com-
plaints with the UN – the one disappointed by the SOC authority’s role.
Judging from Judy Ledgerwood’s sobering report on the perception of UNTAC at
the mid-term of the mission, UNTAC continued to be a point of contact for appeals:
‘With regard to matters of protection of the rights of individuals – in cases of
corruption, land disputes, and protection from perceived ill treatment by SOC
administrative structures – UNTAC is widely viewed as either hopelessly inept
or in collusion with SOC authorities’.65
In Phnom Penh, 163 cases were filed before and, despite the critics, 147 after the
report in September 1992. In the absence of alternatives, the UNO was considered to
be a potential patron for those whose social connections – ksae, which literally
means ‘strings’ in Khmer – had become too ‘short’ and weak to protect their interests.66
Even loyal state functionaries, the backbone of the communist regime, were
affected, as the statement of a middle-ranking official in Kampot translated into
English by UNTAC interpreters shows:
‘We are one of the foreman which serving the state for 14 years … in the mean-
time we always respect to the discipline, the assignment of the party and the
state properly go down to the field for long time or short time. […] During 14
years, the actual result which I had received are only admirable letter and admi-
rable certificate. […] I want you to find the justice for me because some can
have public lands or warehouse as their possession, why not me?’ [sic]67
‘Why not me?’ was the tenor of many complaints, as others were seen to ‘grab’
public properties or were allowed to privatize their provisional right of use per-
manently, including official land registration. In anticipation of a stable peace, the
established pecking order dissolved, and better connected people took their chance
to enrich themselves.
‘Why me?’ was the complementary question. Others, for example, were not
compelled to share their spacious estates in times of scarce residential space, as a
former vice-president of the Cambodian Red Cross complained. After being re-
tired, she was forced to share the housing space of her ‘villa’.68
65 UNTAC was specifically blamed for problems of public security, sexual harassment of male
personnel, reckless driving, etc; see UNTAC/APRONUC, Interoffice Memorandum (Executive
Summary) by Judy Ledgerwood to Timothy Carney/Information-Education Program of 18 Sep-
tember 1992, Phnom Penh (no page numbers).
66 Historically, in Cambodia a highly differentiating terminology for economic and political ‘lead-
ers’, authorities and representatives has developed; see Cambodia Development Resource Institute
(CDRI) (2009), A Study of Leaders in Three Communes of Three Provinces (v. Thon Vimealea,
Ou Sivhuoch et al), CDRI Working Paper Series No 42, Phnom Penh, especially p 31.
67 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 16/2. Kampot – B53 – SOK DARA, Chief of Planning vs. Provincial Au-
thorities.
68 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 5/2. Tuol Kork: 36.265 – PUM CHANTINE.
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Table 1. Overview of pending and closed complaints to CCC, Cambodia, 1992–93 (complaints
caseload: provinces, partial results)a
Complaint House/land Harassment Other  Σ
Active cases 331  42  46  519b
Closed cases 208 218 207  633
Total 539 260 253 1,152
Note: a12 out of 21 provinces including Phnom Penh. bIncluding an estimation of 100 cases for
Prey Veng (province).
Source: NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. POLICIES/GUIDELINES – UNTAC Complaints & Investiga-
tions Service (CIS), Statistical Report 1992 (annex 1, 1a) Intern Office Memorandum C.A.7
(STATREP), 15 February 1993.
Table 2a. Complaints caseload: Phnom Penh, 1992–93.
Complaint House/land Harassmenta Other  Σ
Active cases 166 1 25  192b
Closed cases 96 2 10  108
Total 262 3 35 300
Note: aIncluding 49 cases classified as ‘stalemate’, whereas 143 pending cases were considered as
negotiable/solvable (see Tables 2b and 2c). b‘Note: Harassment cases only include those com-
plaints brought to us by private individuals and NOT those referred by political parties.’




x D  2
x (1975)  6
Total 49a
Note: aExcluding the six cases classified as ‘x (1975)’; see Table 2c.
Table 2c. Definitions of stalemate cases.
x C Cases generally involving the Council of Ministers and other higher institutions where it
is judged there has been an abuse of authority and UNTAC does not agree with the
decision but has been powerless to bring about any reversal or correction of the
situation. Alternatively, cases where there are disagreements between the judicial and
administrative institutions which result in nothing that can be implemented.
x M Cases involving the Ministry of Defence or individual military where we have been
unable to take action.
x I Cases where we agree with the decisions but local authorities either refuse or are unable
to implement due to interference.
x D Cases so complex or lacking in formal detail that they are unlikely ever to be solved.
x (1975) Closed as claim for ownership pre-1975.
Sources (Tables 2a–2c): Final statistics of CCC for Phnom Penh, 1992–93. NAC/UNTAC.BOX
18/1. COMPLAINTS CASES – GENERAL. NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. POLICIES/GUIDELINES
– UNTAC.
A new nexus of money and political connection reigned, taking advantage of
those in a weak position in the hierarchy. In particular, ‘unconnected’ common-
ers, notwithstanding their well established rights to their living space, could be
ripped off for dubious reasons:
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‘Mr MEA SUP [wants] my land who insulted me with obscene words and men-
aced me with his pistol. If I don’t obey, my house will be urgently leveled in a
period of 5 days.’ [sic]69
Mr Y. Neang had rightfully occupied a very well situated house since 1980. All of
a sudden, he was forced to sell the property for US$400 – a fraction of its actual
value. An alleged infringement of the building law served as a pretext.
Individuals, as well as groups with conflicting claims to land and housing, ap-
plied to the UN. One not unusual case even involved a three-way dispute over the
ownership of land close to Kampot/Sihanoukville: 50 workers of a former local
industrial site of the PRK laid claim to 50 plots of land. They had resettled there in
1989 after squatting in the ‘St[r]ung Hav Oil Refinery’. The land application re-
ceipts issued by the provincial land office were challenged by a group of
CPAF-soldiers70 led by a major and several SOC police officers as well. The UN
investigation unit commented:
‘Although the CPAF has resorted to intimidation actions to reinforce its claims,
these are criminal, and not political, in nature. It is neither possible, nor within
our mandate, to decide on the validity of the various claims. The complainants
are agreeable to our position, and are in the process of seeking a settlement
through interdepartmental negotiation.’71
This case, documented in detail by the UNTAC police unit ‘CIVPOL Sihanoukville’
outlines the mission’s dilemma clearly: they could interfere only on the grounds
of Cambodian law. While the formal procedure was correct – even though not
necessarily fair and just – the hands of the CCC were, technically, tied. Claims to
property before 1975 were not, in any case, eligible. The CCC was also unable to
instigate an investigation without a formal complaint, which – it is assumed – left
the majority of cases unreported. In the course of the mission, however, the CCC
took on more and more of their own initiatives for further enquiries, while the
SOC called upon UNTAC more often to decide on politically difficult cases and
to act as moral enforcement of the government’s own (eligible) claims.
The caseload: a statistical overview for Cambodia and Phnom Penh
The Phnom Penh caseload: a qualitative investigation of the complaint files
Tables 1 and 2a, b and c give details of the complaints caseload. Two hundred out
of 300 cases were analysed statistically72 by the author from three perspectives:
(1) who filed the complaints, (2) what were the grounds for the appeal, and (3)
was intimidation involved (and to what level did violence play a role)? Whereas
some cases were reported as straightforward, clearly summarized and well presented,
69 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 3/1. Chamkarmon: 9.027 – Y. NEANG, Letter of complaint to UNTAC, ad-
dressed to Jesudas Bell (annex, 19 August 1992) HR/3-12/RP/35.
70 The Cambodian People’s Armed Forces were renamed the former Kampuchean People’s Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces during the transitional times.
71 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 17/2. Sihanoukville – Groupe de plaignantes de Prek Treng, Investigation
Papers IF/114/92, 19 December 1992.
72 Due to time constraints of the research project, this sample (two-thirds of the entire data for
Phnom Penh), plus additional random sampling, has been deemed statistically sufficient.
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Figure 4a. Complainants (n = 200).
Figure 4b. Case leaders (n = 200).
Note: A case may appear in more than one category.
Key to categories: Family: related persons and inmates/roommates (non-related or ‘adopted’
persons who did not pay rent); most members of these ‘extended families’ were more recent
arrivals; some knew each other from work. They voluntarily shared one common living space.
Neighbours: related or non-related persons living in adjacent but separated living space as a result
of the physical division of former larger estates by order of PRK authority or by mutual agreement.
Business (wo)men: private business people (with a few exceptions, Cambodians only). Government
agency: public authorities and civil services of SOC at state, city, district or village level. Armed
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Figure 5a. Level of intimidation (n = 200).
Categories: Verbal threat of physical violence (without exercise of violence); use of physical force,







































Figure 5b. Nature of complaints (n = 200).
Note: A case may appear in more than one category.
Key to categories: Overreaching: similar to fraud, but without an immediate threat of existence,
such as taking improper advantage of people in distress, exploiting inexperience or credulity (for
example, non-consensual sharing or splitting of living space or unilateral measures by authorities,
including personal enrichment of individual officials) or breaking of previous practices (customs)
in land affairs and property ownership. Official use: formally reasonable and justified property
claim of SOC authorities (public demand) issued by private individuals. Planning: similar to
official use related to city development. Personal use: justified or non-justified property claims of
private individuals by other private individuals. Construction measures: construction work
(maintenance, improvement and upgrading; new building or initial development; technical
modification of public buildings or infrastructure). Profit: commercial purpose and profit-making.
Fraud: intentional deception used for personal gain under false pretences or malicious conceal-
ment with or without exercise of violence, causing serious material or financial damage to the
applicant (for example, evictions, full or partial expropriations with no or inadequate compensa-
tion). Chain selling: repeated informal transfer of (legally) unsecured tenancy and property rights,
making any regress or steps against fraudulent transfer impossible. Politically motivated: harass-
ment and financial/material damage for political reasons. Ethnically motivated: harassment and
financial/material damage on grounds of race, nationality or ethnic background.
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comprising only a few pages, others were voluminous and difficult to disentangle.
However, these latter cases especially provide a more profound insight into what
was happening on the ground (see Figures 4a & b and 5a & b).
At first glance, the high number of family and neighbourhood disputes is remark-
able. To call them ‘family dramas’ is to underrate the seriousness of these conflicts,
sometimes including murder, manslaughter and threatened suicide, the expulsion
of even close relatives, the destruction of goods or the forceful occupation of
living space. Residential property was usually at stake.
About the same number of complaints was brought forward by local authorities
against private individuals: this spectrum ranges, on one hand, from accusations
of arbitrary rule made against the SOC administration to complaints obviously
motivated by bribes. On the other hand, it also includes complaints by the admin-
istration against individual citizens, which were filed with UNTAC on legal grounds.
The level of intimidation, which was a symptom of an ‘extremely violent soci-
ety’73 after 30 years of war, civil war and mass violence, is also striking. One
serious failure of UNTAC was the unsuccessful disarming and decommissioning
of the civil war troops, which left most of them in a precarious (economic) situa-
tion. Only fractions were transferred into the new armed forces of Cambodia.74
Armed forces, discharged or not, easily turned into gunmen. The UN was aware
of a veritable market for private enforcement, which was termed ‘rent-a-soldier’.75
The rush hour to enrichment: a ‘secondary’ accumulation of capital in
Phnom Penh
After the ‘original accumulation’ of political power during the resettlement proc-
ess of Phnom Penh in the early 1980s, a second accumulation process began about
10 years later. The communist economic system was dismantled in favour of the
principles of a free market economy in progress, and the early 1990s became a
period of strategic exploitation and valorization for profitable reasons. All social
strata became involved in the capitalization of landed property from the smallest
up to the largest businesses. Five fields of activities can be identified: land grab-
bing, business, disloyalty of superiors, CPP nationalization and evictions
Land grabbing for personal use
I employ the term ‘land grabbing’ to point to the definitive end of the consensual
way of sharing urban space. The term includes indoor ‘room or flat grabbing’.
Land and residential property, given the current transition of the political economy,
73 Defined by Christian Gerlach as ‘formations where various population groups become victims of
massive physical violence, in which, acting together with organs of the state, diverse social groups
participate for multitude of reasons’; Christian Gerlach (2010), Extremely Violent Societies –
Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, p 1.
74 As late as March 1993, only 55,000 troops (out of 200,000) of the different factions had been
relocated into 52 cantonment facilities. The disarmament programme was suspended since it was
failing to achieve its purpose; Boradem Nhem (2011), A Continuation of Politics by Other Means:
The “Politics” of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992–93), PKSOI Papers – Strategic
Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, pp 24. Peter Hazdra provides a detailed summary of the different
armed forces of the civil war parties, Hazdra, supra note 58, at pp 53–58, 156–164.
75 For example, NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. Phnom Penh. EVICTION CASES – Lau Kok ANG, Memo
Lyndall McLean (Phnom Penh, Provincial HQ) to Eduardo Vetere (Acting Director, Public Secu-
rity), 28 January 1993.
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became highly sought-after assets, especially in Phnom Penh. In the early 1990s the
capital, in particular, was preparing for the foreseeable future of foreign capital
investment, which also needed clear ownership status. The new inhabitants tried to
convert their right of temporal use into full property rights by registering their lots
and apartments.76 The CCC files bear witness to drastic disputes over smaller, even
very small units that were the size of a toilet. However, even minor cases could
provide a stage for the ‘deep play’ of political groups. In one legal conflict, for
instance, Chea Sim and Hun Sen were each supporting one party in the land dispute
over the amount of 520 chi of gold (about US$2,000). Finally, they forwarded this
stalemate case to UNTAC: the neutral UN should act as referee, at least in this case.77
Rental, retail and real estate business
The demand from UNTAC personnel, and later from NGOs, for living and office
space clearly showed the potential of proper real estate in the capital city. ‘Villas’
could be rented out for thousands of US dollars, paid in advance, sometimes for
years.78 The high ‘expense allowances’ of UNTAC also boosted the retail economy
after a sharp decline in small business start-ups over the three years before the UN
mission.79 In Phnom Penh, a veritable ‘gold rush’ broke out, although the streets
were not ‘paved with gold’, but the right location along the street could offer a
golden opportunity.
One speculator, for example, invested in a portfolio of gold, cement and beer.80
He left debts of three-quarters of a million US dollars to his Hong Kong-based
creditors. At the time of his disappearance, 15 buildings were listed on the real
estate register under both his and his wife’s names. These included nine ‘villas’,
most of which had ‘probably’ already been sold in the view of the office director
of the cadastre. Evidently, the ‘investor’ belonged to the group of so-called ‘well-
connected persons’, as the legal representative of the overseas investor group noted
with frustration:
‘Mr. Dim Kim Sorn’s attitude has clearly been displayed by his complete disre-
gard for the legal system in Cambodia, by ignoring any invitation he has received
by the court in the court’s attempt to resolve the above case.’ 81
76 Interviews with real estate agents in Phnom Penh, 2011–12.
77 The case was classified by UNTAC as ‘x C’: ‘Complicated cases involving multiple selling of
property, decisions of various administrative and judicial institutions (conflicting), including the
Council of state and influence of both parties to authorities. We agreed with the Supreme Court,
but the case was still not resolved definitively’, NAC/UNTAC.BOX 3/2. Chamkarmon: 45.171 –
CHHAI POT.
78 Examples: NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/2. Chamkarmon: OTHER CASES – Kong Nath, Protocol, 5 Dec
1993, monthly rent for a villa US$900, three rents in advance, NAC/UNTAC.BOX 4/2. Chamkarmon:
61.229 – SOUTHEAST ASIAN OUTREACH, contract with 15 rents in advance; NAC/UNTAC.BOX
18/1. Phnom Penh. CYA/AN/AC/ER/PP/105 – KANN MAN, rent of US$1,000, investment of the
NGO for adaptation and extension estimated US$25,000 (according to Maurits van Pelt, General
Coordinator MSF – Médecins sans Frontières), Christiane Blancot states a range of rents between
US$1,500 to $10,000 up to three years in advance: Christiane Blancot (1992), ‘Phnom Penh – une
ville-jardin à réglementer’, Urbanisme, Vol 259, décembre, pp 76–79.
79 For a detailed investigation of Phnom Penh’s retail business, see Kolnberger, supra note 39.
80 The shipping documents for Dim Kim Sorn stated, besides 13 kilos gold bars, 5,466 tons of
Portland Cement, 478,000 cans of Heineken, and also 50 tons of ‘raw Cashew Nuts’.
81 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/2. Chamkarmon: OTHER CASES, Affaire commerciale opposant M. Michel
Seeger à M. Dim Kim Sorn, letter to the Phnom Penh tribunal, 1 March 1993; final sum of
damage (according to correspondence, 25 March 1993: US$585,763).
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Table 3. ‘Official’ one-time distribution key and profit quotas of the
Ministry of Social Action.
Distribution key  US$
Level of minister & vice-minster 1,500
Level of director & deputy 900
Level of head of office 500
Level of staff & workers 400
Source: NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. CASES INVOLVING PROPERTIES
OF VARIOUS ‘MINISTRIES’, Ministry of Social Action (PP/JB/MO17,
11/03/1993) UNTAC Memo concerning sale of ‘collective land’.
A further example is provided by the case of the ‘Bopha Khlang Rumsev Restau-
rant Dancing’. This area in Phnom Penh’s Tuol Kork had a building permit and
licence for a ‘cultural centre’, which was transformed into a specific rendezvous
site for male visitors with deep pockets.82 This north-western district of the city
was ‘patronized’ by military and police personnel. When its informal landlords
realized that the official rent and unofficial protection money were too low, they
showed the tenant the door on the pretext of having breached a minor building
code. Pacta [non] sunt servanda: the deceiver was deceived for the sake of higher
profit rates, which were distributed amongst the protectors and their clientele.
Disloyalty of superiors
The UNTAC files brought several distribution keys and profit quotas to light (see
Table 3). According to the rank within the administration, ‘informal’ revenues in
cash were distributed amongst the members and clienteles of the ‘cités’. In the
early 1990s, ‘selling off’ state property caused a rush because the privatization of
properties was going to foreclose this source of revenue in the future, which, to
date, had been shared collectively.
Some disputes produced mutual allegations of greed and fraud. The opportu-
nity for a last ‘cash prize’ was very tempting for superiors, who manipulated land
distribution in their own favour, as the caricature of members of the Ministry of
Culture denounces with hints of bitterness (see Figure 6).
Suspecting that they were being cheated, complainants blocked even reason-
able deals: the ‘underdogs’ tried to take their chances too, as the statement of the
Minister of Health – in my interpretation – shows credibly:
‘The Ministry tried to convince them many times, trying to persuade them by
economic settlement, to protect the interests of both sides, but, in this case, the
Ministry was not successful. The reason is that these people are stubborn, they
insist on having their own highest personal benefit, and are too greedy’.83
The complainants – staff of Phnom Penh’s Calmette Hospital – had settled on
premises which attracted further squatters, but which had been earmarked for
necessary construction work.
The atmosphere was poisoned by a prolonged state of impending insecurity – a
82 Prostitution, particularly prostitution of destitute women of Vietnamese and Cambodian families,
became a mass phenomenon during UNTAC.
83 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 1/2. Daun Penh: 42.248 – CALMETTE HOSPITAL, letter of the Ministry of
Health to UNTAC, 30 September 1992, signed by the chief of staff.
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Figure 6. Disloyal pocketing? The minister in a dubious light. The twilight of a system produced
winners, the lucky few on the right, and losers, the unfortunate many on the left of the sketch, with
the minister as arbitrator of fortune in the middle.
Source: NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. Phnom Penh. SS/HSS/AC/PP97, Ministry of Culture Staff;
English translation added by UNTAC staff.
situation which was aggravated by the decision of Cambodia’s state council turn-
ing state property into party property.
CPP nationalization
In 1993, the ‘Cambodian People’s Party’ (CPP), the direct successor of the Com-
munist Party, legitimized its property and assets. According to a decree of the
State Council of Cambodia (Law of the Assignment of Properties), signed by
Heng Samrin, all movable and immovable properties controlled by the CPP prior
to 1993 were to be considered the Party’s exclusive possessions:
‘The State of Cambodia and the Cambodian People’s Party shall make invento-
ries of their respective properties as of the dates this law came into force (Article
5).’84
De facto, this decision made the CPP into another ‘state party’ of Cambodia, granting
it more superior resources than the competing parties. Party members were to
secure (to ‘inventory’) the claims and were supposed to help to assert their ‘right’,
even with force, when necessary. Phnom Penh experienced a first wave of evic-
tions and confiscations.
The first wave of evictions
The Committee for the Establishment of Social Oder and Security for the Capital
had conducted earlier evictions in the late 1980s: Chinese ‘capitalists’, first and
84 The decision was discussed by the UN; see NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. POLICIES/GUIDELINES
– UNTAC, UNTAC Memo, especially the comments of 31 March 1993.
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foremost, and small businessmen had been deported.85 It is also a known fact that
hundreds of Cambodian families fell victim to power plays of the elites in the
early PRK years and were forced out of the city.86
Individuals or groups of people with good connections, however, rarely be-
came victims of evictions. The inhabitants of the Wat Prayouvong, south-east of
the Independence Monument, for example, could prolong their technically illegal
land occupation of large parts of the temple. The first consensual resettlement
arranged by PRK authorities prevailed against legal claims of the Buddhist monks.
Even in 2009, the ‘informal settlers’ did not receive a land title, which could have
resulted in immediate eviction. However, in 2015 the temple ground was still
being squatted on, also thanks to political influence.87
Besides patronage, location constituted a second factor in being prone to dis-
placement. Without an immediate investment project, ‘informal settlers’ along
Phnom Penh’s railway track bed could keep their overnight ‘constructions
anarchiques’ until the 2010s.88 For others, the SOC-CPP administration coined
two frequently used expressions of 1992–93: ‘anarchy’ and ‘illegal occupant/
squatter’. Many disputes were clear cases of forceful and unwarranted evictions.
Others demonstrated the ambiguity of this period, when some tried to seize the
opportunity to claim their share, as in the dispute over a new embassy building.
Thai authorities, trying to de-escalate the situation, were simply blackmailed.
They were required to pay compensation of US$900 for very basic huts, set up
by squatters on the construction site. Immediately after the settlement, some of
the paid-off settlers set up new huts on the border of the lot, again on public
ground.89
It is not sufficient to define the situation as one of a dichotomy between perpe-
trators and victims, as the case of the so-called ‘casino zone’ at the river front of
the Chaktomuk (close to the Cambodiana Hotel) clearly demonstrates. In 1984–
85, 60 families settled there in 53 houses. In June 1992, 241 families were on the
site, and this figure rose steeply when the news of compensation spread. In July,
1,042 houses were either completed, occupied or under construction. It is known
that there were at least 14 police families and 26 military families present. The
number of Vietnamese families was at least 200.90 In total, 36,000 people were
evicted by Cambodian authorities, some of whom received compensation, some
85 Under Pol Pot, even the massive assistance of the PR of China did not prevent the persecution of
Sino-Khmers or ethnic Chinese by the PRK. However, the hyper-nationalistic Khmer Rouge rule
targeted its ‘historical arch-enemy’, the Vietnamese. Khmer ethno-chauvinism, discriminating
against Chinese Cambodians and Vietnamese, continued under the new regime until the begin-
ning of the change from a socialist to a market economy in the late 1980s; cf CAS (Center for
Advanced Studies) (2009), Ethnic Groups in Cambodia (coordinated by Hean Sokhom), CAS,
Phnom Penh, especially chapter 2 (Ethnic Chinese in Cambodia, by Penny Edwards) and chapter
5 (Les Viêtnamiens au Cambodge, by Didier Bertrand).
86 Gottesman, supra note 8, at pp 179–182.
87 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. EVICTION CASES, Civpol District 1 Phnom Penh, 92/92/AU –
Proyovong Pagoda; originally, 700 families were registered there; interview with Bridges across
Borders (BABC) and inhabitants, January 2012.
88 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/2. Tuol Kork: EVICTION CASES, Letter of the People’s Committee/
Comité Populaire, N. 1005 to chief of district, Toul Kork, concerning Mr. Koy Ny, 29 March
1992.
89 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 3/1. Chamkarmon: 16.064 – SAO HUTH and numerous (New) Thai Em-
bassy; NAC/UNTAC.Box 1/1.Daun Penh: 25.176 – PRAK CHANNY & PRAK CHANDA,
Notification, 30 July 1993 for house 429 EO, street 310.
90 NAC/UNTAC.BOX 18/1. EVICTION CASES, Casino zone; according to an UNTAC survey.
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of whom became victims of unjust treatment, and others for whom micro-specu-
lation did not pay off.91
Conclusions
Reas mean mun rodth is the leitmotif of Hun Sen’s economic pragmatism: ‘the
people become rich before the state’.92 In fact, when the capital was repopulated
after 1979, the people of Phnom Penh were not given ‘riches’, but those who were
allowed in were offered security and subsistence. Some of them – the entourage
of the political elites – received privileges; others were sheltered on the leeward
side of this initial face-to-face state-building during the 1980s. The original accu-
mulation of political power was followed by a first ‘pay day’: the privatization of
property and profits of collective resources in the early 1990s, separating the wheat
from the chaff in terms of political connections. Cambodians were initially reluc-
tant to accumulate wealth in a conspicuous form – now the time had arrived to do
so. In this phase of reconciliation, the SOC/CPP leaders had to tolerate a ‘free
play of personal interests’, which they needed in order to establish a delicate bal-
ance of power within the new party. This social and economic capital was invested
in what Caroline Hughes calls a ‘follower democracy’.93
The paradox of the new situation is that Hun Sen and the CPP have not been
popular with the majority of urban citizens of Cambodia ever since, particularly
in Phnom Penh, whose electorate votes consistently for the opposition. Close contact
with a handful of economic-political protagonists, however, proved to be suffi-
cient for this new type of leadership. The resulting nexus of money and political
influence has even been sealed by strategic marriages of the economic and state
elites.94 Political power in Phnom Penh has never represented the population of
the countryside, and the capital has remained a playground for elites. The (popu-
lar) power base of the CPP then shifted to the provinces, where its funds,
accumulated during the civil war, were invested in permanent electoral campaigns.95
UNTAC was definitely a catalyst for this development, but not the cause, as the
above analysis of its files has shown. UNTAC never governed Cambodia – its
mission would probably have been a failure, had it tried to do so. Where the mis-
sion succeeded, however, was in the repatriation of war refugees and internally
displaced Cambodians, the start of the mine-sweeping campaign, the national elec-
tions, conducted with only minor violence, and the formation of a new government
as a result. Obviously, the patronage system governing Cambodia was the price to
be paid for stability.
91 Ibid.
92 Margaret Slocomb (2006), ‘The nature and role of ideology in the modern Cambodian state’,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 37, p 394.
93 Hughes, supra note 10, at p 5.
94 See: ‘It’s a Family Affair’, Phnom Penh Post, Weekend supplement, 23 February–8 March 2007,
p 8.
95 These funds consisted of money and man-hours poured into intensive political campaigning; cf
COMFREL (Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia); and ‘CPP tailors its tactics to
rural voters’, The Cambodian Daily, 28 Nov 2011, p 1.
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Appendix
Demographic development of Phnom Penh, 1975–92
Table A1. Population of Phnom Penh, 1975–92.
Year Version A Version B
1975 1,800,000a 2,000,000b
1976–78  20,000c 100,000–125,000d
1979  30,000e 122,779f
1980  299,800g 320,000h
1982  390,315i –
1984  423,162j –
1987  584,000k –
1992  667,814l 674,509m
Sources: aSar Pordemien Kampuchea (Kampuchea Press)/Sarpordarmen Kampuchéa, T.I. 1983, 30
janvier; cf Carrier, supra note 11, at p 125; bJacques Migozzi (1973), Cambodge, faits et problème
de population, CNRS, Paris ; cf Vann Molyvann (2003), Modern Khmer Cities, Reyum, Phnom
Penh, p 22 (estimation of UNICEF). cValérie Deletage (2006), ‘Phnom Penh, renaissance d’une
capital sacrifiée’, PhD dissertation, Geography, University of Bordeaux III, p 87. dMarie-Alexan-
drine Martin (1983), ‘L’industrie dans le Kampuchéa démocratique (1975–1978)’, Études rurales
89–90 (L’Asie du Sud-Est entre la Chine et l’Inde Agriculture et pouvoirs), Vol Jan–Sep, pp 77–
110 (p 87). eEvolution démographique de Phnom Penh (1962–2003) BAU/INS; cf Comité
populaire révolutionnaire de Phnom Penh: Recueil de données statistiques 1979–1992. fComité
populaire révolutionnaire de Phnom Penh: Recueil de données statistiques 1979–1992 for Dec
1979. gIbid. hEvolution démographique de Phnom Penh (1962–2003) BAU/INS. iDeletage (2006),
supra source (c), at p 87. jDeletage (2006), supra source (c), at p 87. kUNDP (Kampuchea Needs
Assessment Study), August 1989, according to: Molyvann (2003), supra source (b), at p 22.
lUNCHS (Needs Assessment Mission), May 1992, according to: Molyvann (2003), supra source
(b), at p 2. mUNTAC, cf Deletage (2006), supra source (c), at p 85.
